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Abstract: This work applies various probit/logit models to a database constructed by the authors, consisting of 
rulings by the Spanish Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional, TC) resolving positive conflicts of competence 
between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities from 1981 to 2014. Our goal is to contrast 
empirically whether the decisions of the Court respond strictly to legal criteria (the legalist or formalist viewpoint) or 
if they are determined by political motivations, so that we can state that the TC constitutes an extension, in the 
jurisdictional milieu, of the central executive power (the realist viewpoint). According to the results of our 
estimations, we can state that the approach which appears to predominate in the behaviour of the TC is the legalistic 
one. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most conflictive aspects of the design and functioning of the Spanish “State of 
Autonomies” is the distribution of competences between the Central Government (hereafter 
CG) and the Autonomous Communities (Spanish political regions, hereafter ACs). On one hand, 
it is claimed there is a need to finalize the process of attributing competences to the regions; on 
the other, the CG is criticized for interfering in regional competences. And all sides agree that the 
assignment of competences arising from the Constitution is confusing and unwieldy (Aja, 2014; 
García Roca, ed., 2014), which in the end also affects how citizens understand and value the State 
of Autonomies (López Laborda and Rodrigo, 2015). 
These shortcomings have given rise to numerous conflicts between the CG and the ACs.1 When 
they could not be resolved politically (or the will to do so was lacking), these conflicts were 
referred to the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional, hereafter the TC), the competent 
body according both to the Constitution and to the Organic Law 2/1979, of 3 October (hereafter 
the LOTC). This leads to the question underlying this research - whether the rulings of the Court 
respond strictly to legal criteria (the viewpoint identified in the literature as “legalist” or 
“formalist”) or if they are determined by political motivations (a “realist” viewpoint). In this latter 
case, as TC members are appointed by central institutions, one would expect this body to be 
predisposed to rule in favour of those institutions. 
This work hopes to provide an empirical answer to this question. To keep it within manageable 
limits, the research focuses on “conflicts of competence” in the strict sense, and in particular, on 
the “positive vertical conflicts” governed by Articles 60 - 67 of the LOTC, formalized before the 
TC when the central (autonomic) government considered that a regulation, resolution or act by 
an AC (the State) did not respect the order of competences established in the Constitution, the 
Statutes of Autonomy, and the law.2 If the controversial competence should be attributed by a 
law, or a regulation with the force of law, the conflict of competences is processed as established 
for an action of unconstitutionality.3  
                                                          
1 On the “regulatoy inflation” of the Autonomous Communities, see Marcos et al. (2010). López-Laborda and Vallés 
(2010) analyze the determinants of the regulatory activity of the Autonomous Communities between 1989 and 2001 
and show the relevance of some variables, such as the existence of nationalist political parties in regional 
governments. 
2 The “negative conflict of competence” occurs when the CG (the AC) declines jurisdiction to resolve any claim, 
considering that the competence corresponds to an AC (to the CG or another AC): See Articles 68 – 72 LOTC. 
3 For the definition of conflicts of competence and actions of unconstitutionality, see Muñoz Machado (2007: 377 et 
seq.). 
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After this introduction, the second section of the paper briefly reviews the scarce available 
literature. Next, the third section presents the database created specifically for this research, 
containing all the positive conflicts of competence between the CG and the ACs resolved from 
1981 to 2014. The fourth and fifth sections specify and estimate various probit/logit models 
based on the database mentioned above, in order to determine whether the decisions of the TC 
are better explained from a legal or a political perspective. Our conclusion is that we cannot 
dismiss the legal criteria as the best explanation of the behaviour of the TC, and so we should 
give a negative answer to the question in the title of this paper: no, the Spanish Constitutional 
Court does not appear to be an instrument used by Central Government against the 
Autonomous Communities. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
The literature of other countries has examined in depth all the factors (legal, but also personal, 
economic, ideological, etc.) which influence the behaviour, and thus the rulings, of judges and 
courts. The work of reference is undoubtedly Epstein, Landes and Posner (2013). In Spain, there 
have been cultivators of the economic analysis of justice for a long time (e.g., Pastor, 1993; 
Cabrillo and Fitzpatrick, 2008; Mora-Sanguinetti, 2009), but the specific subject we research here 
has hardly been treated. The works relating most directly to ours are those by Del Castillo (1987), 
Sala (2010, 2011) and Garoupa et al. (2013), for Spain, and Dalla Pellegrina and Garoupa (2013), 
for Italy. 
The seminal work of Del Castillo (1987) offers the first evidence of the behaviour of TC judges. 
The article analyses their particular opinions in relation to the rulings of the Plenary, from the 
creation of the Court until December 1985. Based on a descriptive approach, the results suggest 
the existence of two ideological voting patterns (conservative against progressive judges), 
allowing the author to “presume the existence of a certain regularity in the behavioural model of 
the two groups of judges, in terms of their opinions” (Del Castillo, 1987: 184-185). 
The works of Sala (2010, 2011) study the decisions of the TC in relation to territorial disputes 
between the CG and the ACs, based on the classification of these disputes offered by the 
Ministry of Public Administrations (2008). The earlier of these works analyses, for the 1981-2003 
period, and in descriptive terms, the success rate of the CG and the ACs in relation to the 
controversies in which they were involved. According to the main result of the work, in general 
terms, regions whose legal attitude was more belligerent were attributed a lower success rate. 
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Sala (2011), again starting with the exploitation of the classification of territorial disputes 
provided by the Ministry, and for the period 1980-2008, econometrically estimates the factors 
affecting the probability of the decision favouring the CG or the ACs. Based on the results 
obtained by Sala (2011), if the CG is the plaintiff, its previous success rate in preceding conflicts 
and a lower regional sensitivity of judges increase the probability of the CG being favoured by 
the ruling. The author concludes that the individual preferences of the judges would emerge 
more strongly when the basis for the ruling cannot rest on firm precedents. 
Garoupa et al. (2013), for the period 1980-2006, use econometrics to study the factors 
determining whether a judge votes in line with the political party that backed their nomination. 
To do this, they analyse the votes of the judges in a sample of rulings created with the most 
outstanding cases resolving actions of unconstitutionality. According to the results, the 
probability of a judge voting in line with the interests of the party which appointed him increases 
if that party instigated the legal controversy – at the national or regional level – or the case was 
brought by a nationalist government. However, the authors conclude that party interests cannot 
fully explain judges' behaviour. 
Finally, although it deals with Italy, the research closest to our work is the study by Dalla 
Peregrina and Garoupa (2013), who estimate econometrically, for the 1998-2009 period, variables 
relating to the legalist and realist perspectives, which modulate judgements in favour of the CG in 
conflicts of competence with the Italian regions. The authors find evidence that if the CG brings 
the suit or the judge presiding is in line ideologically with the party of the prime minister (and 
there is an ideological majority in the Court in this vein) there is a greater probability of the ruling 
favouring the CG.  
As Bednar (2004) and Sala (2014) show, the identification of determinants which can predict to 
some degree the result of legal rulings contains clear incentives for modulating the strategic 
behaviour of agents, especially those of territorial administrations in the case of federal States.  
 
3. Database. Descriptive analysis  
The database consists of the 365 rulings on positive conflicts of competence between the CG 
and the ACs from 1981 to 2014. As Figure 1 shows, the regions present nearly three times as 
many conflicts as the CG.4 Figure 2 shows many conflicts were brought by the CG at the start of 
                                                          
4 Conflicts shown as brought by “both” correspond to appeals brought independently by the State and the 
Autonomous Communities and accrued by the TC. 
5 
 
 
the decentralisation process, but the number decreases until the early 90s. In the 80s, the ACs 
presented even more conflicts than the CG. They gradually decreased until 2003, when another 
period of conflict began.  
 
Figure 1. Conflicts brought by each level of government, resolved in the 1981-2014 period. 
Total 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Figure 2. Conflicts brought by each level of government, resolved in the 1981-2014 period 
 
Source: Own elaboration and State Secretariat for Public Administrations (statistics on devolution). 
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Figure 3 shows that the CG presented conflicts of competence, above all, against Catalonia and 
the Basque Country. And in Figure 4 we see that, while the Basque Country, like the CG, 
instigates its conflicts in the 80s,5 Catalonia does so during the entire period analysed. The 
conflicts presented by the other Communities evolve in a very similar way as those brought 
forward by Catalonia. Most positive conflicts of competence against the CG were presented by 
this region. 
 
Figure 3. Conflicts brought by the Central Government against Catalonia or the Basque 
Country, resolved in the 1981-2014 period 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The Basque government decided not to go to the Constitutional Court from 1990 to 2002. See García Roca (2004: 
45). 
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Figure 4. Conflicts brought by Catalonia, the Basque Country and the rest of the regions, 
resolved in the 1981-2014 period 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
As summarized in Figure 5, most of the rulings are favourable to the CG and to both levels of 
administration (i.e., a partially favourable decision). The TC rules in favour of the CG nearly 
twice as much as for the ACs. Also, as can be seen in Figure 6, over time there are fewer rulings 
in favour of the ACs (correlation time-favourable ruling: -0.54) and more in favour of both 
governments (+0.33). 
 
Figure 5. Rulings in favour of each level of government, 1981-2014. Total 
158
84
123 Central Government
Autonomous
Communities
Both
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Figure 6. Rulings in favour of each level of government, 1981-2014 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
As seen in Figure 7, the TC rules unanimously in favour of the CG nearly 70% more than in 
favour of ACs. Over time (Figure 8), there are fewer unanimous rulings in favour of the regions 
(correlation time-favourable ruling: -0.54) and more in favour of both governments (+0.17). 
 
Figure 7. Conflicts resolved by unanimous ruling, 1981-2014. Total 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Figure 8. Conflicts resolved by unanimous ruling, 1981-2014 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table 1 combines the information provided by the database on the government presenting the 
conflicts and the government which is favoured by the rulings of the TC. An examination of the 
table allows us to extend and refine the conclusions drawn from analysing the previous figures. 
 
Table 1. Conflicts presented by, and resolved in favour of, each level of government, 1981-
2014 (In brackets, unanimous rulings)  
   
FAVOURABLE TO 
  
 
  
CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 
AUTONOMOUS 
COMMUNITIES BOTH TOTAL 
 
CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 40 (38) 36 (33) 14 (9) 90 (80) 
BROUGHT 
BY 
AUTONOMOUS 
COMMUNITIES 114 (90) 46 (43) 101 (70) 261 (203) 
 
BOTH 4 (3) 2 (2) 8 (7) 14 (12) 
 
TOTAL 158 (131) 84 (78) 123 (86) 365 (295) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
If the CG presents the conflict, most rulings are in favour of that government: in 95% of cases, 
unanimously. However, there is not much difference from the rulings in favour of the ACs: 36 
compared to 40, and 92% unanimously. And there are fewer rulings in favour of the CG than 
those in favour of the ACs or both administrations: 40 compared to 50. 
If an AC presents the conflict, most rulings are also in favour of the CG: in 79% of cases, 
unanimously. Here there is a marked difference from the rulings in favour of the ACs: 46 
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compared to 114, although there are more unanimous judgements: 93%. It appears that when the 
regions present a conflict, it is clearer for the TC when they are right, than when the CG or both 
governments are. There are also fewer rulings in favour of CG than to the ACs or both 
administrations: 114 compared to 147. 
The cases in which conflicts brought by each administration are accrued are not statistically 
important. But the ones where the ruling is in favour of both governments are important, which 
happens more when the ACs brought the conflict. 
In total, 89% of the conflicts presented by the CG are resolved unanimously. For conflicts 
presented by the ACs, it is 78%. 
Conflicts ruled in favour of the CG are resolved unanimously in 83% of the cases. For conflicts 
in favour of the ACs, it is 93%. 81% of all conflicts are resolved unanimously. 
Table 2 reproduces Table 1, but only for conflicts between the CG and Catalonia which, as we 
have seen above, are quantitatively the most important. As can be seen, the results do not differ 
from those shown in Table 1. It is remarkable that when the CG presents the conflict of 
jurisdiction, the TC rules more in favour of Catalonia. 
 
Table 2. Conflicts presented by, and resolved in favour of, central government and 
Catalonia, 1981-2014 (In brackets, unanimous rulings)  
   
FAVOURABLE TO 
  
 
  
CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT CATALONIA BOTH TOTAL 
 
CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 12 (12) 14 (13) 6 (4) 32 (29) 
BROUGHT 
BY CATALONIA 52 (35) 29 (27) 69 (49) 150 (111) 
 
BOTH 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 3 (3) 
 
TOTAL 65 (48) 44 (41) 76 (54) 185 (143) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Without a more rigorous analysis, these results could be interpreted as supporting the legalist 
behaviour as well as the realist on the part of the TC. In general, the conflicts brought by the CG 
are more likely to be ruled in its favour, and almost always unanimously. Those brought by the 
regions are also mostly ruled in favour of the CG (and also, many are in favour of both levels of 
government). Does this mean the TC is predisposed to support the positions of the CG (in 
accordance with the realist hypothesis) or that the CG does bring cases with more legal basis than 
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the regions (according to the legalist hypothesis)? In the following sections we will try to give an 
econometric answer to this question. 
 
4. Specifications 
Our goal is to determine empirically whether the behaviour of the TC in the resolution of 
positive conflicts of competence between the CG and the ACs is better explained by legal or 
political criteria. If the realist viewpoint dominates, as the TC is a body whose members are 
appointed by central institutions, we would expect a predisposition of the Court to rule in favour 
of the CG. The differences within the TC, if any, would appear when the party in national 
government is different to the party governing the AC. 
To reach our goal, we have specified and estimated three probit/logit models in turn, in which 
we construct the dependent variable differently each time, according to whether the ruling of the 
TC favours the CG exclusively or even partially. The three endogenous variables are as follows: 
1. FAVCG1: A dichotomous variable which takes the value 1 if the TC rules in favour of the 
CG, in all or part of the claim, and 0 if not. 
2. FAVCG2: A dichotomous variable which takes the value 1 if the TC rules totally in favour of 
the CG, and 0 if it rules partly or totally in favour of the AC. 
3. FAVECG3: A discrete variable which takes three values: 0, if the ruling is in favour of the AC; 
1, if it favours both governments; and 2, if it is in favour of the CG. 
The choice of the independent variables and the interpretation of their sign are particularly 
difficult. Let us suppose that we construct- as indeed we do - a variable which takes the value 1 if 
the conflict is brought by the CG and is resolved unanimously, and zero otherwise. A positive 
sign in the estimated coefficient of this variable does not let us discern whether the TC is 
behaving according to the realist or the legalist approach. It might mean that the judges of the 
Court support the CG for political reasons, or because its side of the conflict is legally correct. 
However, the interpretation of a negative sign is clearer. If the fact that the TC unanimously 
resolves a conflict presented by the CG reduces the probability that the ruling is favourable to 
this government, this result means we cannot accept the hypothesis that the behaviour of the TC 
corresponds to the realist viewpoint. Or to put it another way, we cannot reject the legalist 
hypothesis. 
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With this word of caution, we present below all the exogenous variables we have constructed. It 
was not possible to know how each judge voted in each ruling; only when they cast a particular 
opinion. In the fifth section, we explain the variables that have been included in the final 
specifications. All the signs correspond to the legalism hypothesis: 
 PRESCG: A variable that takes the value 1 if the CG presents the conflict alone, and 0 
otherwise. If the CG presenting the conflict reduces the probability of a ruling in its favour, 
we cannot reject the legalism hypothesis: negative sign (-). 
 UNAN: A variable which takes the value 1 if the conflict is resolved unanimously, and 0 
otherwise. If the fact the conflict was resolved unanimously reduces the probability of the 
ruling being favourable to CG, this means we cannot reject the legalist behaviour of the 
Court (-). 
 PRESCG*UNAN: A variable resulting from the interaction of the previous two variables (-). 
 DIFF*UNAN: A variable resulting from the interaction of DIFF and UNAN, the former 
being a variable which takes the value 1 if the conflict affects an AC with a different ideology 
than the CG at the time of the ruling, and 0 otherwise. If the probability of ruling in favour 
of the CG is reduced when a conflict is presented by or against an AC of a different party 
than the CG, and it is resolved unanimously by judges with a different ideology, the 
formalism hypothesis cannot be rejected (-). 
 AGAINSTCAT/AGAINSTBC: Variables which take the value 1 if the CG presented the 
conflict against Catalonia or the Basque Country, respectively, and 0 otherwise for each of the 
two cases (-). 
 PRESCAT/PRESBC: Variables which take the value 1 if the conflict is presented by 
Catalonia or the Basque Country against the State, respectively, and 0 otherwise for each of 
the two cases (-). 
 TIME: A variable introduced as a model trend. The passage of time favours having a body of 
doctrine on the Autonomic State and increasing regional sensitivity by the part of the TC. If 
the passage of time reduces rulings favourable to the CG, the legalism hypothesis cannot be 
rejected (-). 
 IDEOPRESTC: A variable which takes the value 1 if the president of the TC (or the vice-
president, if the president does not participate in the ruling) has the same ideology as the 
national government at the time of the ruling, and 0 otherwise (-). 
 IDEORAP: A variable which takes the value 1 if the rapporteur has the same ideology as the 
national government at the time of the ruling, and 0 otherwise (-). 
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 IDEOTC: A variable which shows the majority ideology of the judges making up the Court at 
the time of issuing each ruling, regardless of which ones effectively took part in the 
deliberations over that ruling. This variable takes the value 1 if the majority is left-wing, and 0 
if it is right-wing. We can assume greater awareness and sensitivity to the regions in left-wing 
judges, so if the TC rules more in favour of the ACs when the majority of the TC is right-
wing, we cannot reject the legalism hypothesis (+).6 
 CGMIN: A variable which takes the value 1 if at the time of the ruling the national 
government did not have a majority of votes in Parliament and was supported by a nationalist 
party. This was the case in the 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th terms of the Spanish Parliament. If these 
periods increase the probability of the TC ruling in favour of the CG, we understand that the 
legalism hypothesis cannot be rejected (+). 
 DUMMIES: We have constructed some additional dichotomic variables which take the value 
1 from the dates described below: 
o According to our data (Figure 2), there is a high rate of conflicts in two periods: 1981-
1989 (CONFL11) and 2003-2009 (CONFL21). The former corresponds with the 
launch of the Autonomic State (and could be extended until 1992, CONFL12, when 
the two major national parties reach an agreement ("Acuerdos Autonómicos") to 
assign the same responsibilities to all ACs); the latter period corresponds with Aznar´s 
second term (right-wing), and the first Zapatero´s (left-wing) first one (this period 
could alternatively start in 2000, CONFL22). If in these periods the rulings are more 
favourable to the ACs, the legalism hypothesis cannot be rejected (-). 
o VAL/CRISIS/CAT: Correspond, respectively, to the ruling of the TC on the Statute 
of Autonomy of the Autonomous Community of Valencia (12 December 2007), the 
start of the economic crisis (second quarter of 2008) and the TC ruling on the Statute 
of Catalonia (27 June 2010). These events are usually associated with a greater pull 
towards centralisation by the CG. Consequently, if the rulings are more favourable to 
the ACs after these dates, the legalism hypothesis cannot be rejected (-). 
o REFLOTC*UNAN: In 2007 the Organic Law of the TC (LOTC) was reformed, 
incorporating intervention of the ACs in the nominations of TC judges proposed by 
the Senate. The first appointment took place in late December 2010. If after that date 
                                                          
6 The ideology of the president and judges of the TC, until 2006, were taken from Garoupa et al. (2013); from that 
date, from the assessments of political commentators in the press. 
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there are more unanimous rulings in favour of the CG, the legalism hypothesis 
cannot be rejected (+). 
o REFFIN*: Reforms of the regional financing system. We have constructed five 
dummies (REFFIN1 to REFFIN5), which take the value of 1 during the three years 
before the approval of the successive reforms of the regional financing system 
(passed, respectively, on 7 November 1986, 20 January 1992, 23 September 1996, 27 
July 2001 and 15 June 2009), and 0 otherwise.  We assume that regional financial 
reforms would have a dampening effect on the demands of the ACs and their 
conflicts with the CG, but this effect would be expected to weaken over time. 
Consequently, if in the years before a new reform the TC ruled more against the CG, 
the legalism hypothesis cannot be rejected (-). 
 
5. Estimation and results 
First, we performed an analysis of the correlation between the variables described above. These 
correlations are shown in Table 3. As can be seen in the table, the correlation between some of 
the explanatory variables is high enough for us not to accept the complete list in the specification 
of the different models. Our criterion for selection was to eliminate one of the two presenting a 
positive or negative correlation with an absolute value over 0.5. The descriptive statistics of the 
selected variables are shown in table 4. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Thus, for each of the three proposed endogenous variables, the initial specification was as 
follows: 
[1] 
 






iiiiiiii
iiiiiii
i
u,...REFFIN,CONFL,CONFL,CGMIN,UNAN*REFLOTC,IDEOTC,IDEOREP
,IDEOPRESTC,PRESBC,PRESCAT,AGAINSTBC,AGAINSTCAT,UNAN*DIFF,PRESCG
fFAVCGX
512212
 
Where FAVCGX represents, alternatively, each of the three selected endogenous variables: 
FAVCG1, FAVCG2 and FAVCG3. Since these three variables are discrete, we opted to 
estimate [1] using probit/logit models, selecting the model with the highest value of the log-
likelihood function. Also, the hierarchical nature of the values of FAVCG3 recommends the use 
of an ordered probit/logit model for estimate this variable. Subindex i corresponds to each ruling 
resolving a conflict of competence. 
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The estimations with each of the three endogenous variables, are presented in Tables 5 
(FAVCG1 and FAVCG2) and 6 (FAVCG3). Together with the estimated value of the 
coefficient, the value of the marginal effects is offered in case the explanatory variable proves to 
be significant. 
For each endogenous variable, we also present an estimation corresponding to a much more 
stylized model, resulting from a process in which the variables least satisfactory in terms of 
significance are successively pulled out of the specification described in [1]. We identify these 
estimations in Tables 5 and 6 as FAVCG1(2), FAVCG(2) and FAVCG 3(2). 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Simplified models have lower values in the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria 
than complete models. Therefore, we will describe the results achieved focusing exclusively on 
these abbreviated models. In the estimation of the variable FAVCG1, where the value 1 shows 
rulings totally or partly favourable to the CG, there are three variables which are found to be 
significant, with the negative sign supporting the hypothesis of legalism: PRESCG, 
DIFF*UNAN and CONFL12. So if the conflict is brought by the CG (unlike the results 
obtained by Sala, 2011 and Dalla Peregrina and Garoupa, 2013), the ruling is unanimous and 
affects an AC with a political colour other than that of the CG, or is issued before the approval 
of the autonomic pacts of 1992, this reduces the probability of the ruling being at least partly 
favourable to the CG. 
If the conflict is against the Basque Country (AGAINSTBC), this increases the probability that 
the ruling favours the CG (with a level of significance very close to 10%). As we remarked above 
while explaining the construction of the independent variables, this positive sign does not let us 
conclude whether the TC is guided more by political or legal criteria. The most we can say is that 
this result does not support unambiguously the legalism hypothesis. 
Regarding the estimation of the variable FAVCG2, which takes the value 1 only for rulings that 
are strictly favourable to the CG (but not, therefore, to those that say both sides are right), three 
significant variables have the sign associated with the legalist viewpoint: the conflict was 
presented by Catalonia (PRESCAT) or was resolved in the period of conflict between the CG 
and the ACs which began at the turn of the century (CONFL22) or the years before the 2001 
reform of the regional financing system (REFFIN4). The same negative sign favouring the 
formalist hypothesis (although again with a significance slightly over 10%) has the variable that 
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reflects whether the conflicts are instigated against the Autonomous Community of Catalonia 
(AGAINSTCAT). 
In the last estimation, the dependent variable is FAVCG3, which as we explain above, takes the 
value 0 if the ruling is in favour of the AC; 1, if it favours both governments; and 2, if it is in 
favour of the CG. In this estimation the significant variables, with the sign associated with the 
legalist hypothesis, are PRESCG, PRESCAT, CONFL12 and REFFIN4, the last two with 
significance a little over 10%. With the same caution regarding the level of confidence, the 
variable CGMIN is also significant, but with a negative sign that does not allow us to support the 
legalism hypothesis. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper applies various probit/logit models to a self-constructed database, consisting of the 
365 rulings by the Spanish Constitutional Court resolving positive conflicts of competence 
between the Central Government and the Autonomous Communities from 1981 to 2014. Our 
goal was to contrast empirically whether the decisions of the Court basically respond to legal 
criteria (the legalist or formalist viewpoint) or if they are determined by political motivations, so 
that we can state that the TC constitutes an extension, in the jurisdictional milieu, of the central 
executive power (the realist viewpoint). According to the results of our three estimations, we can 
state that the approach which appears to predominate in the behaviour of the TC is the legalist 
one. 
Conflicts of competence represent only a small part of the disputes between the national 
government and the Autonomous Communities that end up being judged by the TC (Aja, 2014), 
and they share some characteristics that should be noted. First, they have a very specific 
objective: to decide on the ownership or exercise of a competence. Second, as explained in the 
introduction, conflicts affect regulations, resolutions and acts, but not laws: competence conflicts 
affecting laws should be treated as acts of unconstitutionality. Although we do not think that 
these unique features justify differentiated behaviour by the Constitutional Court, we cannot be 
sure that the results found in this research can be extrapolated to any dispute between the Central 
Government and the Autonomous Communities. Testing this hypothesis constitutes a logical 
extension of this work. 
 
 
17 
 
 
References  
Aja, E. (2014): Estado autonómico y reforma federal (Autonomic State and Federal Reform), Madrid: 
Alianza Editorial. 
Bednar, J. (2004): “Judicial Predictability and Federal Stability: Strategic Consequences of 
Institutional Imperfection”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16 (4): 423-446. 
Cabrillo, F and S. Fitzpatrick (2008): The Economics of Courts and Litigation, Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar. 
Dalla Pellegrina, L. and N. Garoupa (2013): “Choosing between the government and the regions: 
An empirical analysis of the Italian Constitutional Court decisions”, European Journal of Political 
Research, 52 (5): 558-580.  
Del Castillo, P. (1987): ‘‘Notas para el Estudio del Comportamiento Judicial. El Caso del Tribunal 
Constitucional” (Notes for the Study of Judicial Behaviour. The Case of the Constitutional 
Court), Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional, 20: 177-191. 
Epstein, L., W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner (2013): The Behavior of Federal Judges. A Theoretical and 
Empirical Study of Rational Choice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
García Roca, J. (2004): “La consolidación de la democracia y justicia constitucionales” (The 
Consolidation of Constitutional Democracy and Justice), Revista Jurídica de Castilla y León, Número 
Extraordinario. 25 años de Constitución: lo que nos une: 33-50. 
García Roca, J., ed. (2014): Pautas para una reforma constitucional. Informe para el debate (Guidelines for 
Constitutional Reform. A Report for Discussion), Cizur Menor: Thomson Reuters Aranzadi. 
Garoupa, N., F. Gomez-Pomar and V. Grembi (2013): “Judging under Political Pressure: An 
Empirical Analysis of Constitutional Review Voting in the Spanish Constitutional Court”, Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29 (3): 513-534. 
López-Laborda, J. and F. Rodrigo (2015): “Attribution of regional responsibilities for public 
services and citizens’ support for decentralisation: Evidence for Spain”, Revista Española de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas, 152: 65-86. 
López-Laborda, J. and J. Vallés-Giménez (2010): “Factors explaining the regulatory activity of the 
Spanish Autonomous Communities”, Environment and Planning C: Government an Policy, 28: 469-491. 
Marcos, F., J. Santaló and A. Sánchez-Graells (2010): “Measuring regulatory intensity by the 
Spanish regions (1978-2009)”, IE Business School Working Paper, DE8-132-I. 
Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas – Ministry of Public Administrations (2008): Base de 
Datos. Administraciones territoriales (Database. Territorial Administrations). Madrid, MAP-Lexter (CD-
Rom). 
Mora-Sanguinetti, J. (2009): “A Characterization of the Judicial System in Spain: Analysis with 
Formalism Indices”, Documento de Trabajo 2009-23, FEDEA. 
Muñoz Machado, S. (2007): Derecho Público de las Comunidades Autónomas II (Autonomic Public Law 
II), 2nd ed., Madrid: Iustel. 
Pastor, S. (1993): ¡Ah de la justicia!, política judicial y economía (Justice Ahoy!, Judicial Politics and 
Economy), Madrid: Ministry of Justice Publications. 
Sala, G. (2010): Can Courts Make Federalism Work?: The Impact of the Constitutional Court on Federal 
Conflict in Spain, doctoral thesis, Yale University. 
18 
 
 
Sala, G. (2011): “Courts as Political Institutions with Legal Constraints: Evidence from Spain”, 
work presented at the ECPR General Conference 2011. 
Sala, G. (2014): “Can Courts Make Federalism Work? A Game Theory Approach to Court-
Induced Compliance and Defection in Federal Systems”, Economies, 2 (193-217). 
19 
 
 
Table 3. Correlations among the different variables of the specification 
FAVECG1 FAVECG2 FAVECG3 PRESCG PRESCG*UNAN DIFF*UNAN AGAINSTCAT AGAINSTBC PRESCAT PRESBC TIME CGMIN REFLOTC*UNAN IDEOPRESTC IDEORAP IDEOTC CAT CRISIS CONFL11 CONFL12 CONFL21 CONFL22 REFFIN1 REFFIN2 REFFIN3 REFFIN4 REFFIN5
FAVECG1 1,00
FAVECG2 0,83 1,00
FAVECG3 0,88 0,48 1,00
PRESCG -0,11 -0,23 0,01 1,00
PRESCG*UNAN -0,09 -0,23 0,05 0,93 1,00
DIFF*UNAN -0,05 -0,13 0,03 0,11 0,20 1,00
AGAINSTCAT -0,10 -0,15 -0,04 0,47 0,44 0,18 1,00
AGAINSTBC -0,02 -0,03 -0,01 0,39 0,38 0,21 -0,07 1,00
PRESCAT -0,05 0,07 -0,15 -0,48 -0,44 0,09 -0,20 -0,21 1,00
PRESBC 0,06 0,06 0,05 -0,26 -0,24 0,15 -0,11 0,03 -0,10 1,00
TIME 0,09 0,22 -0,04 -0,33 -0,34 -0,29 -0,25 -0,22 0,15 -0,27 1,00
CGMIN -0,06 0,01 -0,10 -0,03 -0,04 -0,09 -0,02 0,12 0,03 0,06 0,07 1,00
REFLOTC*UNAN 0,12 0,10 0,10 -0,22 -0,19 0,00 -0,14 -0,14 0,05 -0,23 0,64 -0,20 1,00
IDEOPRESTC -0,04 0,07 -0,12 -0,15 -0,13 -0,13 -0,12 -0,04 0,04 -0,09 0,47 0,14 0,35 1,00
IDEORAP -0,04 0,05 -0,10 -0,18 -0,16 -0,11 -0,10 -0,08 0,07 -0,11 0,55 0,05 0,37 0,66 1,00
IDEOTC -0,04 0,01 -0,08 0,01 0,00 -0,08 0,06 -0,06 -0,01 0,03 0,00 0,31 -0,07 0,20 0,16 1,00
CAT 0,12 0,16 0,06 -0,27 -0,24 -0,14 -0,16 -0,17 0,07 -0,27 0,76 -0,23 0,86 0,36 0,45 -0,14 1,00
CRISIS 0,10 0,14 0,04 -0,28 -0,25 -0,15 -0,17 -0,17 0,05 -0,28 0,77 -0,19 0,84 0,35 0,43 -0,13 0,98 1,00
CONFL11 -0,05 -0,18 0,08 0,24 0,25 0,21 0,16 0,16 -0,15 0,17 -0,81 -0,24 -0,36 -0,39 -0,47 -0,22 -0,42 -0,42 1,00
CONFL12 -0,08 -0,22 0,07 0,25 0,26 0,25 0,18 0,14 -0,16 0,20 -0,85 -0,31 -0,42 -0,45 -0,48 -0,13 -0,49 -0,50 0,85 1,00
CONFL21 -0,02 0,09 -0,11 -0,07 -0,11 -0,15 -0,08 0,03 0,06 -0,12 0,18 0,30 -0,13 -0,01 -0,09 -0,04 -0,15 -0,08 -0,18 -0,21 1,00
CONFL22 -0,06 0,09 -0,18 -0,06 -0,11 -0,20 -0,10 -0,01 0,08 -0,15 0,22 0,17 -0,17 0,15 0,03 -0,03 -0,20 -0,14 -0,23 -0,27 0,78 1,00
REFFIN1 0,00 -0,08 0,07 0,14 0,15 0,18 0,06 0,08 -0,04 0,10 -0,47 -0,21 -0,19 -0,37 -0,39 -0,56 -0,22 -0,23 0,53 0,45 -0,10 -0,12 1,00
REFFIN2 -0,07 -0,15 0,02 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,02 -0,07 -0,06 0,04 -0,22 -0,22 -0,20 -0,20 -0,10 0,22 -0,23 -0,24 0,09 0,48 -0,10 -0,13 -0,14 1,00
REFFIN3 -0,02 -0,02 -0,02 -0,07 -0,06 -0,01 -0,08 0,03 0,15 0,03 0,04 0,45 -0,13 -0,05 -0,06 0,15 -0,15 -0,16 -0,18 -0,21 -0,07 -0,09 -0,10 -0,10 1,00
REFFIN4 -0,07 0,04 -0,15 -0,05 -0,04 -0,08 -0,06 -0,06 0,04 -0,01 0,10 0,05 -0,10 0,27 0,11 0,11 -0,12 -0,12 -0,14 -0,16 -0,05 0,36 -0,07 -0,08 -0,05 1,00
REFFIN5 -0,06 -0,01 -0,09 0,00 -0,08 -0,19 -0,05 0,08 -0,01 -0,07 0,12 0,26 -0,08 -0,08 -0,10 0,08 -0,09 -0,01 -0,10 -0,12 0,58 0,45 -0,06 -0,06 -0,04 -0,03 1,00  
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Table 4. Basic descriptive statistics of the variables finally used in the specifications of the different models 
 
A) Endogenous variables 
 
VARIABLE FAVCG1 FAVCG2 FAVCG3 
Average 0.77 0.43 1.20 
Median 1 0 1 
Maximum value 1 1 2 
Minimum value 0 0 0 
Standard deviation 0.42 0.50 0.79 
Coefficient of skewness -1.28 0.27 -0.37 
Coefficient of kurtosis 2.64 1.07 1.70 
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B) Exogenous variables 
 
VARIABLE 
PRESCG 
DIFF* 
UNAN 
AGAINST 
CAT 
AGAIN
STBC 
PRES 
CAT 
PRE
SBC 
IDEO 
PRESTC 
IDEO 
RAP 
IDEO 
TC 
CG 
MIN 
CONFL 
12 
CONFL 
22 
REF 
LOTC 
REFFIN1 REFFIN2 REFFIN3 REFFIN4 REFFIN5 
Average 0.25 0.63 0.09 0.09 0.41 0.17 0.63 0.57 0.76 0.25 0.4 0.10 0.26 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.02 
Median 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 
value 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 
Minimum 
value 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 
Standard 
deviation 
0.43 0.48 0.28 0.29 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.30 0.44 0.33 0.34 0.24 
0.19 0.15 
Coefficient 
of skewness 
1.18 -0.53 2.92 2.80 0.36 1.76 -0.53 -0.29 -1.21 1.18 0.41 2.69 1.11 2.33 0.45 3.60 
4.81 6.53 
Coefficient 
of kurtosis 
2.38 1.28 9.50 8.84 1.13 4.09 1.28 1.09 2.47 2.38 1.17 8.25 2.23 6.43 2.31 13.94 
24.11 43.65 
 
22 
 
 
 
Table 5. Results of the probit/logita estimations for the endogenous variables FAVECG1 and FAVECG2 
 FAVCG1 FAVCG1(2) FAVCG2 FAVCG2(2) 
 coefficient jX
YP

 )1(  
coefficient jX
YP

 )1(  
coefficient jX
YP

 )1(  
coefficient jX
YP

 )1(  
PRESCG -0.76*** -0.24 -0.65*** -0.21 -0.15    
DIFF*UNAN -0.34* -0.09 -0.29* -0.08 0.15    
AGAINSTCAT 0.07    -0.60  -0.64(p>|z|=0.103) -0.15 
AGAINSTBC 0.54* 0.12 0.45 (p>|z|=0.103)  
( 
 
0.11 -0.38    
PRESCAT -0.10    -0.82*** -0.20 -0.65*** -0.15 
PRESBC 0.15    -0.03    
IDEOPRESTC -0.09    -0.17    
IDEORAP -0.12    -0.29    
IDEOTC 0.45    0.30    
REFLOTC*UNAN -0.08    0.33    
CGMIN -0.25    -0.17    
CONFL12 -0.42  -0.45** -0.13 0.03    
CONFL22 0.56    -0.81  -1.21** -0.25 
REFFIN1 -0.01    0.28    
REFFIN2 -0.41    -0.06    
REFFIN3 -0.35    0.05    
REFFIN4 -0.31    -1.76  -1.87* -0.33 
REFFIN5 -0.96    -0.77    
INTERCEPT 1.33**  1.28***  0.01  0.18  
No. observations 365 365 365 365 
 LR 
2   43.08 32.90 
 
32.91 26.46 
Prob > 2  
 
0.0008 0.0000 0.0171 0.0000 
Log-likelihood function 
 
-175.3552 
 
0 
-180.4455 -233.2471 -236.4715 
 
Pseudo R2 of prediction 
 
Percentage of correct 
predictions by the model 
 
 
 
0.1094 
78.63% 
0.0836 
77.53% 
0.0659 
61.92% 
0.0530 
61.64% 
AIC / BIC 388.711/462.8091  370.891/390.3905  504.4943/578.5923 482.943/502.4425  
a The table shows, in the columns, the value of the estimated coefficient of each variable and the marginal effect of the significant variables over the probability that the endogenous variables take the value 1.  
The results correspond to a probit or logit model, attending to the conventional choice of whichever of the two which presents the greater estimated value of the log-likelihood function. 
*** Significant coefficient at 1%, ** significant coefficient at 5%, * significant coefficient at 10%. The p-value is also given when the significance is very close to 10%. 
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Table 6. Results of the estimations of the ordered probit modela for the endogenous variable FAVECG3 
 FAVCG3 
FAVE3 
FAVCG3(2) 
FAVE2 
 coefficient 
¶P(Y = 0)
¶X j
 ¶P(Y =1)
¶X j
 ¶P(Y = 2)
¶X j
 
coefficient 
¶P(Y = 0)
¶X j
 ¶P(Y =1)
¶X j
 ¶P(Y = 2)
¶X j
 
PRESCG -0.37(p>|z|=0.101) 0.12 0.02 -0.14 -0.44*** 0.14 0.03 -0.17 
DIFF*UNAN -0.07        
AGAINSTCAT -0.21        
AGAINSTBC 0.09        
PRESCAT -0.32** 0.10 0.03 -0.13 -0.35** 0.11 0.03 -0.13 
PRESBC 0.06        
IDEOPRESTC 0.04        
IDEORAP -0.14        
IDEOTC 0.38        
REFLOTC*UNAN 0.15        
CGMIN -0.15    -0.23(p>|z|=0.106) 0.07 0.02 -0.09 
CONFL12 -0.15    -0.22(p>|z|=0.108) 0.07 0.02 -0.08 
CONFL22 -0.07        
REFFIN1 0.14        
REFFIN2 -0.21        
REFFIN3 -0.12        
REFFIN4 -0.38    -0.48(p>|z|=0.106) 0.16 0.01 -0.17 
REFFIN5 -0.39        
c1 (first threshold) -0.97 -1.17 
c2 (second threshold) -0.03 -0.24 
No. observations 365 365 
LR 2   21.97 16.27 
Prob > 2  0.2335 0.0061 
Log-likelihood function 
 
-378.50189 -381.34924 
Pseudo R2 of prediction 0.0282 0.0209 
AIC / BIC 797.0038/875.0017 776.6985/803.9978  
a The Table shows, in the  columns, the value of the estimated coefficient of each variable and the marginal effect of the significant variables over the probability that the endogenous variable FAVECG3 takes each one 
of its possible values (0, 1, 2). 
*** Significant coefficient at 1%, ** significant coefficient at 5%, * significant coefficient at 10%. The p-value is also given when the significance is very close to 10%. 
 
 
